An Examination of Compressed Natural Gas for Use in Municipal Fleets: Would CNG Work for Lexington, KY? by Kahne, Robert
University of Kentucky 
UKnowledge 
MPA/MPP Capstone Projects Martin School of Public Policy and Administration 
2011 
An Examination of Compressed Natural Gas for Use in Municipal 
Fleets: Would CNG Work for Lexington, KY? 
Robert Kahne 
University of Kentucky 
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/mpampp_etds 
 Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons, and the Public Affairs, 
Public Policy and Public Administration Commons 
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Kahne, Robert, "An Examination of Compressed Natural Gas for Use in Municipal Fleets: Would CNG Work 
for Lexington, KY?" (2011). MPA/MPP Capstone Projects. 101. 
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/mpampp_etds/101 
This Graduate Capstone Project is brought to you for free and open access by the Martin School of Public Policy 
and Administration at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in MPA/MPP Capstone Projects by an 
authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu. 
An Examination of Compressed Natural Gas For Use In Municipal Fleets: Would 
CNG Work For Lexington, KY? 
Robert Kahne 
Executive Summary 
Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) is an alternative fuel source which could replace diesel as a fuel 
for municipal fleets.  This paper seeks to examine the viability of CNG and its potential to power 
Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government’s fleet of waste removal trucks.  This paper takes into 
account financial and environmental factors in determining CNG’s potential, but gives priority to 
financial considerations.  The results of this analysis are mixed—under some future scenarios, 
compressed natural gas would be a favorable option for the fleet, but given other future scenarios, CNG 
would not be viable.  In terms of environmental benefits, a switch to CNG would represent at most a 
0.08% reduction in greenhouse gases, but would net other social benefits such as increased visibility and 
lower cancer rates.  
This analysis takes into account six different scenarios using two different variables.  The 
scenarios are built using three different prices for diesel fuel: high prices, low prices, and the USA Energy 
Information Association’s point estimate for the price diesel fuel, coupled with two different 
assumptions about the cost of compressed natural gas trucks compared to the cost of diesel trucks.  
Under the high price of diesel scenarios, there is a possibility that savings associated with adoption of 
compressed natural gas to fuel Lexington refuse vehicles could fully offset costs of the switch within a 
10-year payback period. Under all other scenarios, the estimated savings would not fully offset costs 
within that payback period. 
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Introduction 
 For several decades municipalities have sought sources of fuel other than petroleum to power 
their various fleets.  There exist multiple motivations for doing this, but the chief motivations include 
future financial savings and improved environmental stewardship.  The price of petroleum products 
represents a major expense for municipalities, as it is a leading factor in transportation costs.  
Transportation costs are significant factors in all municipal budgets, therefore municipalities want to 
minimize these costs.  The supply of oil depends heavily on many factors outside the control of 
municipal governments, and forecasts indicate that the price of oil could increase significantly in the 
future.  Because of this, some municipal governments are seeking other sources of fuel (EIA). 
 In addition to financial arguments, environmental stewardship could motivate municipalities to 
switch from diesel fuel to alternative fuels.  Municipalities provide several services which require the use 
of heavy duty vehicles—they are used to transport students, pick up garbage and recycling refuse, salt 
roads, and build public projects.  While heavy duty vehicles make up only 4% of the United State vehicle 
fleet, they account for 25% of the fuel demand (Bryson, Underwood, 2006).  Burning fuel emits several 
chemicals, including significant amounts of carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, carbon monoxide, and nitric 
dioxide—all of which have been found by the United States Environmental Protection Agency to be 
threats to human health.  In addition, many municipalities have taken it upon themselves to take part in 
the Kyoto Protocol, an environmental pact which failed to pass the US Senate (Riley).  Cities take part in 
this treaty by signing the Mayors Climate Protection Agreement, which calls for a 7% reduction in 
emissions below 1990 levels.  The city of Lexington, along with 1,046 other cities has signed on to this 
agreement. 
 Municipalities have begun replacing some of their diesel fuel demand with compressed natural 
gas.  Compressed natural gas demand has grown significantly since the mid 2000s—beginning in 
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California and then spreading to Texas and New York and then to many other locations across the 
country.  How compressed natural gas took hold in each of these locations explains a significant amount 
about why municipal demand for compressed natural gas has increased in use from the west coast to 
the east coast since 2004, and gives clues about whether or not compressed natural gas is a viable 
option for LFUCG. 
The Spread of Compressed Natural Gas 
 In the summer of 2000, the South Coast Air Quality Management District, an air pollution 
regulatory body in southern California, passed a regulation stating that any fleet—public or private—
with more than fifteen vehicles must buy vehicles which use a fuel deemed ‘clean’ by the SCAQMD 
whenever it replaced or added to its fleet.  Vehicle manufacturers sued the Air Quality Management 
District, and in 2004, the United States Supreme Court ruled 8-1 that the regulatory agency did not have 
the authority to regulate private fleets (Engine Manufacturers…, 2004).  Shortly after that decision, the 
South Coast Air Quality Management District amended its ruling such that it only applied to government 
fleets and—importantly— to fleets which contract directly with the government.  Almost overnight, the 
market for alternatively fueled vehicles grew by the amount of trucks used to complete city contracts.  If 
fleets wanted to keep their contracts with municipal governments, they had to find ways to operate 
with clean fuels. 
 At this point, Clean Energy Corporation, a well-funded company with an experienced leader in 
the energy industry at the helm, was in a prime position to take advantage of this new development.  
Between 2006 and 2011, Clean Energy built 46 new compressed natural gas stations on the south coast 
of California.  As of February 2011, Clean Energy operated 46 fueling stations within the confines of the 
South Coast Air Quality Management District (Clean Energy, 2011). 
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 In 2006, a meeting occurred between two people which had a significant impact on the spread 
of CNG.  Joanna Underwood, the President of Energy Vision—a not-for-profit seeking to expand the use 
of renewable and alternative fuels—met Russell Barnett, the Environmental Director in the town of 
Smithtown, NY.  Ms. Underwood had given a presentation about the use of compressed natural gas in 
municipal waste fleets which had caught Mr. Barnett’s attention.  The two of them began a 
collaboration to facilitate the expansion of CNG use to the East Coast. 
 Smithtown is a town on Long Island in New York with 118,000 people.  Its division of waste 
management has 22 trucks which use 250,000 diesel gallon equivalents per year.  It contracts with 4 
different waste removal companies (called carters) to service the town.  In 2006, Mr. Barnett devised a 
plan to utilize CNG in these fleets.  Drawing from the example in California, Mr. Barnett worked to pass a 
law in Smithtown that carters which have a contract with the town must utilize Compressed Natural Gas 
as their fuel source.  The town entered into a contract with Clean Energy Corporation to build a natural 
gas compressor.  Smithtown agreed to provide business to the compressor for a term of 20 years by 
requiring their carters to buy CNG, and in return, Smithtown negotiated a 7 year fixed price for the 
compressed natural gas it sells, which it passed on to the carters (Barnett, 2011). 
 According to Mr. Barnett, the carters that contract with Smithtown favor this contracting policy.  
In his estimation, fixed pricing allows contractors to more accurately forecast their costs and weigh 
whether or not contracting with the city is profitable.  The costs of contracts between Smithtown and 
the carters did become more expensive because of the premium which carters had to now pay for 
compressed natural gas trucks.  The employees who collect refuse in Smithtown were originally reticent 
to accept the new trucks because of perceived deficiencies in the torque and power of the trucks, but 
according to Mr. Barnett, once they realized that CNG burned odorless and tasteless and that the 
deficiencies were less than expected, they became some of the biggest supporters of the switch. 
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 Mr. Barnett’s figures indicate a $3.34 savings per home against using diesel.  He arrives at these 
figures from a $7.38 per home incremental cost for CNG vehicles (incremental fleet cost) and a $10.72 
per home fuel savings.  This touted success has caused compressed natural gas to spread to the nearby 
town of Brookhaven (Underwood, 2011)(DiBrita, 2011). 
 Brookhaven is the largest of the 14 towns on Long Island.  It is more than double the size of 
Smithtown, with 450,000 people and a fleet of 67 trucks.  After hearing about the claimed results of the 
compressed natural gas program in Smithtown, the city of Brookhaven also opted to implement a law 
requiring contractors to utilize compressed natural gas.  Brookhaven also contracted with Clean Energy 
to build a compressed natural gas filling station in their town.  The second station built by Clean Energy 
on Long Island is larger than the first, and would allow for expansion to other parts of Long Island 
(DiBrita, 2011). 
 While Clean Energy often points to Long Island as a success story, the question remains as to 
whether or not these cases are comparable to Lexington, KY.  There exist significant differences 
between Lexington, these Long Island towns, and southern California.  First and foremost, Lexington 
owns its own fleet of refuse collection vehicles.  Also, Lexington does not have an air quality regulatory 
body requiring adoption of alternative fuels.  Unlike California, a switch to CNG in Lexington would 
represent a proactive change—meaning the status quo is a viable option in Lexington.  Unlike Long 
Island, Lexington would have fewer points at which to hedge its risk—meaning that any cost increase 
would be entirely born by the city, not by the city and contractors.  While there exist significant and 
important similarities between Lexington and these areas, a better fix to Lexington might be found 
elsewhere. 
 A city with a situation more similar to Lexington’s is San Antonio, TX.  Like Lexington, San 
Antonio operates its own fleet of refuse collection trucks.  Unlike any of the other cities in question, San 
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Antonio owns the local natural gas provider, and therefore sells the gas directly to Clean Energy to 
compress.  The contract with Clean Energy is just to compress the natural gas, and therefore leaves the 
city the most exposed to risk of any of the cities in question.  In an interview with David Lopez, the 
administrative chief of San Antonio’s solid waste division, he revealed that San Antonio originally 
decided to use compressed natural gas for the cost savings it thought it would realize.  Lopez stated that 
the fuel cost savings had been significant, but it was up in the air as to whether or not the savings would 
pay for the extra cost which the city paid for the trucks.  Mr. Lopez indicated that San Antonio was “on 
the fence” about expanding the use of compressed natural gas. 
 There exist a multitude of reasons why San Antonio might be less satisfied with its CNG program 
than Long Island.  However, it is interesting to note that the municipality with the situation most closely 
resembling Lexington is the municipality which is the least enthusiastic about the use of the fuel.  
Perhaps the same issues which make Lexington comparable to San Antonio also predict a similar less-
than-impressive result from adopting CNG.  This necessitates additional analysis of the potential for the 
use of CNG in the city of Lexington. 
The Use of Compressed Natural Gas 
 The two driving factors which led to the spread of compressed natural gas across the country 
are expected financial savings and the anticipated environmental improvements related to the use of 
compressed natural gas.  Technology is never static, and all fuels burn considerably cleaner than they 
ever have before.  However, compressed natural gas burns quantifiably cleaner than traditional diesel 
without particulate capturing technologies (Ayala, 2011) (Das, 2000) (Chandler, 2002). 
 The Environmental Protection Agency states that burning compressed natural gas as opposed to 
petroleum based fuels reduces the emissions of carbon monoxide by between 90-97%, and reduces the 
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amount of carbon dioxide by 25%.  In addition to these reductions in greenhouse gases, there is also 
“little to no particulate matter” or carcinogens released by burning compressed natural gas as opposed 
to burning petroleum based fuels (Clean Alternative Fuels, 2002). 
 However, other studies point to problems with burning compressed natural gas.  CNG is mostly 
methane, and burning methane releases different chemicals than petroleum—particularly 
formaldehyde, a human carcinogen (Turrio-Baldassarri, 2006) (Kado, 2005).  In some studies, especially 
ones conducted internationally, CNG has been shown to increase the amount of NOx, nitrous oxide, in 
the atmosphere (Compressed Natural Gas versus Diesel…, 2005) (Ravindra, 2006).  In all studies which 
cite this phenomenon, it remains scientifically unexplained.  However, even in studies citing these 
problems with CNG, the conclusion has been that compressed natural gas represents an improvement 
over conventional diesel in terms of greenhouse gas emissions. 
 Alberto Ayala is the chief of the monitoring and laboratory division of the California 
Environmental Protection Agency.  He has conducted more than 20 studies regarding particulate matter 
and other emissions, with a significant amount of those studies involving the use of Compressed Natural 
Gas.  In an interview, he said that the question which he finds most intriguing is comparing compressed 
natural gas to clean diesel.  This is relevant, as clean diesel may be another option for reducing 
emissions for municipalities while retaining the ability to use existing equipment and facilities. 
 Ultra-low sulfur diesel (ULSD) is a cleaner variety of diesel which has been shown to emit 
considerably less particulate matter and fewer greenhouse gases.  It has been in use in most of the 
United States since 2006.  Using this fuel is helpful for reducing emissions.  In addition, there are several 
repairs to vehicles which use diesel that can reduce emissions, including particulate filters and carbon 
capturers.  These physical repairs also significantly reduce the emissions of vehicles which run on diesel 
(Schubert, 2010) (Study of CNG and Diesel Transit Emissions, 2004) (ARB’s Study of Emissions…, 2002). 
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 In Mr. Ayala’s estimation, neither compressed natural gas nor complete utilization of these 
clean diesel technologies produces a better result than the other from an emissions standpoint.  In other 
words, neither technology dominates the other in terms of emissions.  However, both of these 
alternatives have a cost associated with them (Ayala, 2011).  As the LFUCG is actively considering CNG, 
this is the alternative that is evaluated in this report.  This analysis will not consider the use of clean 
diesel, but this alternative ought to also be examined by LFUCG. 
 How the world will change in the future also represents an important consideration to make 
when considering a switch to CNG.  According to Joanna Underwood of Energy Vision, the goal for heavy 
duty vehicle fuels should be biomethane—a transportation fuel derived from biological waste such as 
food or animal waste.  Biomethane has the energy potential to deliver the performance needed for 
larger vehicles, while hybrid and electric vehicle alternatives do not, in her opinion.  Biomethane is a 
gaseous fuel which has the same composition as compressed natural gas.  If a vehicle accepts 
compressed natural gas, it will also accept biomethane.  Biomethane is carbon neutral or carbon 
negative.  Also, as long as the human population continues consuming meat at the current rate and 
continues utilizing its current landfill system, biomethane represents a completely renewable fuel.  It is 
likely worthwhile to take this into account when considering a switch from diesel to compressed natural 
gas.  
 Concerns about extraction and the after-use impacts of fuel use also exist when considering 
compressed natural gas and petroleum.  First, the United States owns vast reserves of natural gas.  What 
natural gas the United States does import, it imports from Europe and Canada.  If concerns exist about 
the issue of energy dependence, it would appear that natural gas would provide an amenable 
alternative to petroleum, which is in part imported from the Middle East and Venezuela (Ayala, 2011) 
(Underwood, 2011).   
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However, there are concerns about the production of natural gas.  Hydraulic fracking is a 
method of mining natural gas in which large amounts of water, sand, and chemicals are pumped into a 
well, freeing natural gas to flow more smoothly.  In 2004, the US EPA released a study concluding that 
there existed no linkage between hydraulic fracking and drinking water contamination, despite 
hypotheses that this process led to issues surrounding water table contamination and earthquakes 
(Evaluation of Impacts…, 2004).  Other than the EPA study, little scholarly work exists on this issue as of 
yet, but there has been an Oscar-nominated documentary entitled Gasland made about the dangers of 
fracking.  There is a new paper which the journal Climate Change Letters will publish in May about the 
damages of fracking.  Media reports about the paper quote that “Compared to coal, the [greenhouse 
gas] footprint of shale gas is at least 20% greater and perhaps more than twice as great on the 20-year 
horizon and is comparable when compared over 100 years.”  The issue of fracking will likely be one 
debated in academic circles in the coming years, but little solid evidence has been published about it by 
the time of this analysis. (Fast Company, 2011) 
Compressed Natural Gas in Lexington, KY 
 Lexington, KY is a city of 270,000 which operates its own fleet of 125 refuse collection trucks.  
Like many other municipalities, Lexington has signed onto the Kyoto Protocol.  Clean Energy Corporation 
approached the municipality recently about investigating the use of compressed natural gas in its refuse 
collection fleet.  The city of Lexington’s Division of Waste Management’s director, Richard Boone, is 
currently investigating whether or not this switch would make sense. 
 The city of Lexington is attracted to the use of CNG because of its potential cost savings and for 
its reduced environmental impact.  In order to determine whether or not it should switch to compressed 
natural gas, the cost and benefits of doing so must be investigated.  First, the benefits in terms of 
emissions reduction will be quantified.  Then, in order to determine if the city will receive any cost 
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savings, a model will be constructed taking into account the expenditures of the city on fuel if it 
continues to use diesel compared to a potential shift to compressed natural gas. 
 The benefits to Lexington with which this analysis is concerned include the reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions due to a switch from diesel to the use of compressed natural gas.  As a 
signatory of the US Mayor’s Climate Protection Agreement, the Lexington Fayette Urban County 
Government has obligated itself to reduce its emissions to 7% less than 1990 amounts.  Furthermore, 
the city has joined the International Council of Local Environmental Initiatives, which requires its 
members to complete a “baseline emissions inventory and forecast” in order to adopt an emissions 
target (Webb, 2011). 
 Lexington’s Department of Environmental Quality recently completed their “baseline emissions 
inventory and forecast.”  As a part of that report, the LFUCG learned that their vehicle fleets made up 
13% of its total carbon footprint, as can be seen in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1 - LFUCG Emissions, by Source
Source: LFUCG Department of 
Environmental Quality 
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 Furthermore, research by Energy Vision, the National Energy Policy Institute and the California 
Department of Energy indicates that switching from diesel to CNG reduces greenhouse gas emissions 
from between 11% and 29% (Krupnik, 2010)(Stoner, 2007)(Cannon, 2006).  A high estimate for the 
impact of switching from diesel to CNG, therefore, would be reducing 13% of LFUCG’s total emissions by 
29%.  This would have the effect of reducing LFUCG’s total emissions by 4%.  The corresponding low 
estimate would yield a 1.5% reduction. 
 The Mayor’s Climate Change Climate Protection Agreement requires that communities reduce 
their total greenhouse gas output to 7% below 1990 levels.  The LFUCG makes up 2% of the total 
greenhouse gas output of the city of Lexington.  Therefore, if the switch were to be made to CNG, it 
would have the effect of reducing 2% of the city’s total by 4%.  Therefore, ultimately, if a switch to CNG 
were to be made, it would reduce LFUCG’s emissions by .08%.   
The financial model completed in this analysis forecasts savings due to a switch from 
compressed natural gas for the years of 2011 until 2021.  This test period is utilized because according to 
Mike Riley of Clean Energy, the typical contract period with Clean Energy is ten years.   This model 
includes six different scenarios.  The scenarios are a product of the three different diesel price 
assumptions (high, point estimate, and low prices) and two different assumptions about how much 
more the government would pay for compressed natural gas vehicles compared to diesel trucks.  
Compressed natural gas trucks are more expensive than regular diesel trucks.  The exact surcharge is 
impossible to forecast, as each municipality contracts with vehicle manufacturers based on a multitude 
of different rationales.  However, from interviews with professionals in the field of compressed natural 
gas, it can be reasonably assumed that the exact cost is between $40,000 and $60,000 for each CNG 
truck (DiBrita, 2011)(Underwood, 2011)(Barnett, 2011)(Lopez, 2011).  As a point of reference, Lexington 
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typically pays $250,000 for a new diesel truck.  The additional $40,000 and $60,000 are the two 
surcharges used in this model. 
 Lexington’s expenditures on diesel fuel are a function of the price of diesel and the city’s 
demand for fuel.  In order to forecast expenditures, then, assumptions regarding the future values of 
these factors need to be determined.  The United States Energy Information Administration reports on 
and forecasts the price of different fuels.  From the EIA, one can easily determine the price of diesel in 
any past year.  For purposes of this project, EIA estimates for diesel in the region where Lexington exists 
were used in order to calculate the city government’s expenditures for fuel. 
 However, moving into the future proves a bit more difficult.  The price of diesel fuel is a function 
of several different factors—refining costs, distribution & marketing, taxes, and crude oil all play a part 
in the cost of diesel fuel.  The EIA does provide estimates about the price of diesel going forward, but 
does not speculate on a range of prices in the future.  The EIA does, however, provide a high and low 
estimate for the price of crude oil in the future.  For the purposes of this project, the estimates of high 
and low prices of diesel were determined in the following manner. 
• Determine the mean difference between the high estimate and point estimate for crude oil as 
projected by the EIA between the years 2011 and 2035.  This turned out to be a mean 
difference of 154%. 
• Determine the mean difference between the low estimate and point estimate for crude oil as 
projected by the EIA between the same period of time.  This turned out to be a mean difference 
of 49%.  
• Multiplying the point estimate for diesel prices for the EIA by the mean differences calculated 
above. 
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In short, EIA point estimates for diesel were multiplied by 156% and 49% to determine a high and low 
price for diesel. 
At this point it becomes necessary to address the rationale for how the EIA develops its high 
price and low price projections for crude oil.  The data used in this project comes from the EIA document 
entitled “Annual Energy Outlook 2010 with projections to 2035.”  Inside this document, the EIA justifies 
its predictions on both the supply and demand sides.  According to this document, the low price of oil 
depends primarily on the supply side of the market, with OPEC nations opening development to private 
firms and increasing their supply.   The high price depends on both supply and demand—demand in that 
worldwide growth increases demand for oil and supply in that OPEC remains closed and non-OPEC 
countries adopt more conservative fiscal policies.  Furthermore, under the high price scenario, 
regulation of products containing petroleum increases.  
 The tactic used to estimate diesel prices in this analysis projects the high and low estimates for 
the price of diesel only utilizing the price of crude oil.  If the other factors involving the price of diesel 
change at a different rate, or do not change at all, that will not be captured in the estimates.  Figure 2 
reports the EIA estimates for the makeup of the price of petroleum products.  Analysis of Figure 2 shows 
that taxes represent the factor in the price of petroleum products which varies the most.  Municipal 
governments do not pay taxes on petroleum products.  Additionally, the two other factors included in 
the EIA’s assessment depend on the price of crude oil.  Therefore, this assumption is believed 
reasonable.  The EIA also reports and forecasts the price of natural gas.  This project also utilizes those 
estimates.  
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 Figure 3 shows the price of fuels using EIA estimates.  Solid lines indicate the historic prices as 
reported by the EIA, while dots indicate forecasted prices.  Dashes project the high and low prices of 
diesel.  A high and low price for natural gas was not calculated.  Natural gas prices only come into play 
when calculating profits for the company compressing the natural gas.  In this model, Clean Energy 
would charge a fixed price for natural gas and therefore assumes all the risk associated with varying 
prices of natural gas.  The profits and losses of Clean Energy are of little concern to LFUCG, and 
therefore natural gas prices are only used for reference in Figure 3. 
In order to determine the demand for fuel in Lexington, Richard Boone, a data manager for the 
waste management division of LFUCG, was contacted.  Although a report about the change in demand in 
Lexington has not been published, after examining the data provided by Tracey Thurman of the LFUCG, 
Mr. Boone recommended utilizing a 5% annual growth rate.  As can be seen in Figure 4, given the six 
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K a h n e  | 15 
 
data points previous, this 5% growth rate seems a reasonable assumption.  The mean marginal change 
in fuel usage between the six data points in the LFUCG data is 5.5%.  
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The information from Figures 3 and 4 indicate how the city would consume diesel fuel given the 
status quo.  Three scenarios can be shown assuming LFUCG continues to fuel their trucks with diesel by 
multiplying the demand for fuel by the three different estimates for the price of diesel.  We can use 
these scenarios as a base case, or counterfactual, in order to compare an alternate future which takes 
into account a policy change.  This alternative future takes into account estimates about the price 
charged for compressed natural gas.   Figure five shows the three different expenditures on diesel which 
LFUCG would make under the different prices shown in figure four. 
 
Clean Energy Corporation has contractually agreed to charge towns in Long Island, NY a fixed set 
for compressed natural gas which is allowed to increase at 11 cents annually between the years of 2008 
and 2013, beginning at the price of $2.502/diesel gallon equivalent (DGE) in 2008.  For this model, these 
numbers are utilized.  In addition, the 11 cent annual increase is kept throughout the 10 year period.  
Table 1 shows these prices.   It is possible that, if Lexington were to enter into a contractual agreement 
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with Clean Energy, it may negotiate a different price schedule than did the towns on Long Island.  
However, given that Clean Energy has a large amount of vertical integration as a national corporation 
with access to natural gas markets all over the country; this means that Clean Energy has a similar ability 
to supply CNG to most of the United States.  Therefore, supply would not be a factor in whether or not 
Lexington faces a similar price schedule to the one on Long Island.  Although it is conceivable that the 
price schedule which Clean Energy wants to supply to Lexington would differ, there do not seem to be 
any physical rationale for why the Long Island price schedule would not be possible.  Therefore, this 
report utilizes the Long Island prices.  Furthermore, from data obtained from Long Island and the EIA, it 
appears that Clean Energy bases its price of diesel gallon equivalents of compressed natural gas on the 
price of diesel rather than the price of natural gas.  This point will be discussed in greater detail later in 
the analysis.  Given these factors, this analysis utilizes the prices charged to Long Island towns as the 
estimated prices for CNG in Lexington.   
Table 1 - Price of CNG on Long Island 
per Diesel Gallon Equivalent 
2008  $                         2.335  
2009  $                         2.502  
2010  $                         2.613  
2011  $                         2.724  
2012  $                         2.836  
2013  $                         2.947  
2014  $                         3.058  
2015  $                         3.169  
2016  $                         3.280  
2017  $                         3.391  
2018  $                         3.502  
2019  $                         3.613  
2020  $                         3.724  
2021  $                         3.835  
Red Values indicate actual prices on 
Long Island (source: Russell Barnett, 
Smithtown, NY), black values indicate 
author’s projections. 
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Total fuel expenditures for a CNG fleet can be calculated by multiplying the prices in Table 1 by 
the demand for fuel shown in Figure 4.  Figure 6 compares estimated total fuel expenditures for a CNG 
fleet to the three scenarios of total fuel expenditures of a diesel fleet. 
 
  
At this point, only the expenditures on fuel have been estimated.  In order to complete the 
analysis, expenditures for equipment and facilities must also be considered as well.  In every Clean 
Energy contract studied for this project, Clean Energy built and maintained a compressed natural gas 
facility from which municipal governments were contractually obligated to buy.  Therefore, the only 
additional cost faced by the municipal government was the extra cost for each compressed natural gas 
vehicle purchased.   As stated above, the range of extra costs this model utilizes are $40,000 and 
$60,000 per vehicle. 
According to documents obtained from the Department of General Services of Lexington 
Fayette Urban County Government, Lexington replaces an average of 21 of its fleet of 114 annually.  To 
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complete the analysis, the total fuel savings accumulating over the 10-year period from a switch to 
compressed natural gas is subtracted from the extra cost the government must pay for the number of 
CNG vehicles purchased. This can be seen graphically in Figure 4.  The difference between the various 
diesel curves and the CNG curve are the fuel savings due to CNG.  Since this change occurs gradually the 
per-truck savings due to a switch to CNG is calculated, and then multiplied by the number of CNG trucks 
purchased by the government in each year.  For instance, there are only 21 CNG trucks in use during a 
hypothetical 2011, and therefore only the savings accrued to those 21 trucks are considered.  In 2012, 
that number grows to 42.  By 2016, the full 113 truck fleet would be compressed natural gas vehicles, 
and therefore the full fuel savings amount could be realized. 
In order to accurately represent the likely savings for LFUCG, two items must be compared.  
First, the positive fuel savings estimated for the switch from diesel to CNG due to the fact that CNG is 
cheaper than diesel; and second, the additional costs associated with the higher price of CNG vehicles.  
The net savings from the two factors was calculated for each year.  Then annual net savings were 
summed from each year to the next to determine whether the accumulated net savings become positive 
in any year of the 10-year time horizon under analysis.  These accumulated savings can be seen in 
figures seven and eight, and in Tables 2-4. 
As an example, for the high price of diesel and the smaller ($40,000) additional cost for CNG 
trucks, the fuel savings in 2011 from adopting CNG vehicles is $178,785.51.  This is the cost of fuel that 
21 of the 113 trucks in LFUCG’s fleet would use given the demand for fuel found in Figure 4.  The 21 CNG 
vehicles would cost an additional $840,000 over the cost of diesel trucks.  (This is 21 multiplied by 
$40,000.)  The difference between these the fuel savings and the additional price of the CNG trucks 
represents a net annual cost of $(661,214).  In 2012, the fuel savings due to using CNG as a fuel could be 
$322,000, which is the amount of fuel that 42 trucks in LFUCG’s fleet would use given the demand found 
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in figure four.  The 21 new CNG vehicles bought by LFUCG would again, cost $840,000.  The difference 
between the 2012 figures is $(518,044).  This figure, when added to the 2011 figure of $(661,214) is 
$(1,179,258).  This is the figure reported in both table two and figure seven.  This process is repeated for 
each year between 2011 and 2021.  The differential between CNG savings and the surcharge becomes 
positive in 2015, and the accumulated differentials become positive in 2020 for this scenario. 
As can be seen from the graphs, in a future where either the EIA point estimate price for diesel 
or the lower bound estimated price for diesel holds, the fuel cost savings from a change to compressed 
natural gas will never exceed the additional cost of the CNG trucks.  However, if the price of diesel were 
to approach the upper bound estimate, and the extra cost of a CNG truck is $40,000 rather than 
$60,000, a switch to CNG would pay for itself within 10 years.   
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Figure 7 - Accumulated Savings with $60,000 per 
CNG Truck Surcharge
High Price of Diesel
EIA Estimate For Diesel
Low Price of Diesel
Source: EIA, LFUCG, Smithtown, NY, 
Author’s Projections 
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No. of CNG Vehicles Fuel Savings of CNG Vehicles Differential Accumulated Savings Fuel Savings of CNG Vehicles Differential Accumulated Savings
2011 21 178,785.51$                              (661,214.49)$          (661,214.49)$                                      178,785.51$                               (1,081,214.49)$         (1,081,214.49)$                                   
2012 42 321,955.83$                              (518,044.17)$          (1,179,258.66)$                                   321,955.83$                               (938,044.17)$             (2,019,258.66)$                                   
2013 63 502,152.13$                              (337,847.87)$          (1,517,106.53)$                                   502,152.13$                               (757,847.87)$             (2,777,106.53)$                                   
2014 84 693,228.39$                              (146,771.61)$          (1,663,878.14)$                                   693,228.39$                               (566,771.61)$             (3,343,878.14)$                                   
2015 105 898,604.61$                              58,604.61$              (1,605,273.53)$                                   898,604.61$                               (361,395.39)$             (3,705,273.53)$                                   
2016 113 1,057,358.19$                           217,358.19$            (1,387,915.34)$                                   1,057,358.19$                            (202,641.81)$             (3,907,915.34)$                                   
2017 113 1,121,922.73$                           281,922.73$            (1,105,992.61)$                                   1,121,922.73$                            (138,077.27)$             (4,045,992.61)$                                   
2018 113 1,197,746.02$                           357,746.02$            (748,246.59)$                                      1,197,746.02$                            (62,253.98)$               (4,108,246.59)$                                   
2019 113 1,270,257.13$                           430,257.13$            (317,989.46)$                                      1,270,257.13$                            10,257.13$                (4,097,989.46)$                                   
2020 113 1,325,809.35$                           485,809.35$            167,819.89$                                        1,325,809.35$                            65,809.35$                (4,032,180.11)$                                   
2021 113 1,312,271.47$                           472,271.47$            640,091.37$                                        1,312,271.47$                            52,271.47$                (3,979,908.63)$                                   
Table 2 - Accumulated Savings for LFUCG Given Upper Bound Price for Diesel
$40K Surcharge for CNG Vehicles $60K Surcharge for CNG Vehicles
 
No. of CNG Vehicles Fuel Savings of CNG Vehicles Differential Accumulated Savings Fuel Savings of CNG Vehicles Differential Accumulated Savings
2011 21 27,160.37$                                         (812,839.63)$               (812,839.63)$                                 27,160.37$                                                        (1,232,839.63)$           (1,232,839.63)$                              
2012 42 15,195.55$                                         (824,804.45)$               (1,637,644.08)$                              15,195.55$                                                        (1,244,804.45)$           (2,477,644.08)$                              
2013 63 8,988.14$                                           (831,011.86)$               (2,468,655.94)$                              8,988.14$                                                           (1,251,011.86)$           (3,728,655.94)$                              
2014 84 (10,188.71)$                                       (850,188.71)$               (3,318,844.65)$                              (10,188.71)$                                                       (1,270,188.71)$           (4,998,844.65)$                              
2015 105 (42,245.29)$                                       (882,245.29)$               (4,201,089.94)$                              (42,245.29)$                                                       (1,302,245.29)$           (6,301,089.94)$                              
2016 113 (45,327.26)$                                       (885,327.26)$               (5,086,417.20)$                              (45,327.26)$                                                       (1,305,327.26)$           (7,606,417.20)$                              
2017 113 (65,790.82)$                                       (905,790.82)$               (5,992,208.03)$                              (65,790.82)$                                                       (1,325,790.82)$           (8,932,208.03)$                              
2018 113 (83,414.56)$                                       (923,414.56)$               (6,915,622.58)$                              (83,414.56)$                                                       (1,343,414.56)$           (10,275,622.58)$                            
2019 113 (107,821.88)$                                     (947,821.88)$               (7,863,444.46)$                              (107,821.88)$                                                     (1,367,821.88)$           (11,643,444.46)$                            
2020 113 (148,061.17)$                                     (988,061.17)$               (8,851,505.64)$                              (148,061.17)$                                                     (1,408,061.17)$           (13,051,505.64)$                            
2021 113 (237,868.74)$                                     (1,077,868.74)$           (9,929,374.38)$                              (237,868.74)$                                                     (1,497,868.74)$           (14,549,374.38)$                            
Table 3 - Accumulated Savings for LFUCG Given EIA Point Estimate for Price of Diesel
$40K Surcharge for CNG Vehicles $60K for CNG Vehicles
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Figure 8 - Accumulated Savings With $40,000 per 
CNG Truck Surcharge
High Price of Diesel
EIA Estimate for Diesel
Low Price of Diesel
Source: EIA, LFUCG, Smithtown, NY, 
Author’s Projections 
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Source: EIA, LFUCG, Smithtown, NY, Author’s Projections 
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No. of CNG Vehicles Fuel Savings of CNG Vehicles Differential Accumulated Savings Fuel Savings of CNG Vehicles Differential Accumulated Savings
2011 21 (110,926.81)$                                          (950,926.81)$             (950,926.81)$                                       (110,926.81)$                                   (1,370,926.81)$         (1,370,926.81)$                                   
2012 42 (132,087.71)$                                          (972,087.71)$             (1,923,014.52)$                                   (132,087.71)$                                   (1,392,087.71)$         (2,763,014.52)$                                   
2013 63 (146,714.45)$                                          (986,714.45)$             (2,909,728.97)$                                   (146,714.45)$                                   (1,406,714.45)$         (4,169,728.97)$                                   
2014 84 (162,700.18)$                                          (1,002,700.18)$          (3,912,429.14)$                                   (162,700.18)$                                   (1,422,700.18)$         (5,592,429.14)$                                   
2015 105 (179,818.15)$                                          (1,019,818.15)$          (4,932,247.29)$                                   (179,818.15)$                                   (1,439,818.15)$         (7,032,247.29)$                                   
2016 113 (195,050.72)$                                          (1,035,050.72)$          (5,967,298.02)$                                   (195,050.72)$                                   (1,455,050.72)$         (8,487,298.02)$                                   
2017 113 (213,244.51)$                                          (1,053,244.51)$          (7,020,542.52)$                                   (213,244.51)$                                   (1,473,244.51)$         (9,960,542.52)$                                   
2018 113 (232,335.41)$                                          (1,072,335.41)$          (8,092,877.93)$                                   (232,335.41)$                                   (1,492,335.41)$         (11,452,877.93)$                                 
2019 113 (253,274.52)$                                          (1,093,274.52)$          (9,186,152.45)$                                   (253,274.52)$                                   (1,513,274.52)$         (12,966,152.45)$                                 
2020 113 (276,965.12)$                                          (1,116,965.12)$          (10,303,117.57)$                                 (276,965.12)$                                   (1,536,965.12)$         (14,503,117.57)$                                 
2021 113 (306,563.50)$                                          (1,146,563.50)$          (11,449,681.07)$                                 (306,563.50)$                                   (1,566,563.50)$         (16,069,681.07)$                                 
Table 4 - Accumulated Savings for LFUCG Given Lower Bound Price for Diesel
$40K Surcharge for CNG Vehicles $60K Surcharge for CNG Vehicles
 
The case of the high price of diesel merits further investigation.  As can be seen from figure eight 
and table two, it appears that given a high price of diesel, the program could pay back even with a high 
surcharge for CNG trucks--eventually.  The EIA provides estimates of the price of diesel until the year 
2035.  In its estimates from 2011 until the year 2021, the EIA average increase in their point estimate for 
diesel is $0.1110 per year, which is the exact annual increase Clean Energy has negotiated with the 
towns on Long Island for compressed natural gas.  However, from the years 2021 until 2031, the average 
increase in EIA’s point estimates for diesel is only $0.0498, and from 2035, the average increase is 
$0.0167.  Therefore, if this model is extended past 2021, it is not rational to assume the average 
increases in the diesel gallon equivalent stay at $0.1110.  It is extremely likely that the city will 
renegotiate prices with Clean Energy.  For the purposes of this model, the annual increase in the price of 
a diesel gallon equivalent of CNG charged by Clean Energy between the years of 2021 and 2031 has 
been changed to $0.0498, and from 2031 until 2035, it has been changed to $0.0167.  These 
assumptions are the basis for figure nine, which shows an extension of the high price, high surcharge 
scenario from figure eight and table two.  Under these conditions, the high price of diesel with high 
surcharge for trucks begins paying back in 2029, which would be under the second hypothetical contract 
period with Clean Energy Corporation. 
Source: EIA, LFUCG, Smithtown, NY, Author’s Projections 
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 Of course, the further into the future the model projects, the less accurate the predictions are 
likely to be.  Assuming a 5% growth rate for the city for such a long period of time may become 
problematic.   Also, it seems odd to base the future price of compressed natural gas on the future price 
of diesel.  However, there does not seem to be any correlation between the diesel gallon equivalent 
price of natural gas and the price charged by Clean Energy.  Therefore, the price of natural gas on which 
Figure 7 is based is the best guess the author could make.  Figure 9 likely represents the least accurate 
chart in this analysis.  It is put forward as an example of how the pattern of longer term savings might be 
different than the 10-year comparison; however, it is not considered reliable as a basis for current 
decisions. 
 Until this point, the analysis has rested on the calculation of dollar amounts over time, without 
taking into account the time value of money.  By taking the time value of money into account, we 
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author’s projections 
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acknowledge that future expenditures are relatively cheaper than expenditures made in the present.  In 
order to take the time value of money into account, a discount rate must be determined.  This discount 
rate is the rate at which future expenditures are less expensive than current expenditures.   
For example, the alternative to the LFUCG spending money on a CNG project would be for the 
LFUCG to spend money on something else.  The return of this “something else” ought to be compared to 
the return generated by the CNG project, as opposed to the calculation of dollars over time being 
compared to the CNG project.  The difference between the return generated by the proposed policy and 
the alternative—“something else”—is a way to visualize the discount rate.  The discount rate is not just 
dependent on the direct return of projects, however.  The discount rate could vary also based on how 
the actions of the public sector affect the actions of the private sector.  The amount by which public 
projects decrease private investment is called the “crowding out” effect.  According to a circular 
publication by the federal Office of Management and Budget, the base-case real discount rate applied to 
public projects ought to be 7%.  This takes into account the typical rate of return for public money and 
the average “crowding out” effect seen by public projects.  However, there exist considerable caveats 
which allow the discount rate to move either direction. 
 For purposes of this project, the discount rate could be smaller than 7%.  There currently exists 
no compressed natural gas filling station in the city of Lexington.  Also, the city currently purchases its 
own diesel and does not buy from local gas stations.  Therefore, there would be relatively less “crowding 
out” of private investment due to the CNG project in relation to other public projects.  However, since 
this assertion defies empirical proof, a range of discount rates ought to be considered.  Tables five, six, 
and seven describe a range of total savings taking into account the time value of money using a variety 
of discount rates.  It is easily seen that taking the time value of money into account further reduces the 
legitimacy of the claim that utilizing compressed natural gas will save the government money. 
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 Now it seems that even given the extended scenario of the $60,000 surcharge and the high price 
of diesel, a CNG program would not pay back, given a 7% discount rate.  Even when extending the 
scenario of high price of diesel with a low surcharge to 2035 (table seven), given a discount rate higher 
than 8%, the project would not pay back. 
Discount Rate High Surcharge TMV of Savings Low Surcharge TMV of Savings
0.04 (14,549,374.38)$     ($11,510,539.91) (9,929,374.38)$       ($7,831,139.69)
0.05 (14,549,374.38)$     ($10,896,665.41) (9,929,374.38)$       ($7,407,971.44)
0.06 (14,549,374.38)$     ($10,330,253.31) (9,929,374.38)$       ($7,017,765.99)
0.07 (14,549,374.38)$    ($9,806,877.18) (9,929,374.38)$      ($6,657,433.96)
0.08 (14,549,374.38)$     ($9,322,579.15) (9,929,374.38)$       ($6,324,214.16)
0.09 (14,549,374.38)$     ($8,873,815.25) (9,929,374.38)$       ($6,015,635.22)
0.1 (14,549,374.38)$     ($8,457,407.62) (9,929,374.38)$       ($5,729,481.99)
Discount Rate High Surcharge TMV of Savings Low Surcharge TMV of Savings
0.04 (3,979,908.63)$       (3,587,094.30)$       640,091.37$           92,305.92$           
0.05 (3,979,908.63)$       (3,498,570.64)$       640,091.37$           (9,876.67)$            
0.06 (3,979,908.63)$       (3,413,553.12)$       640,091.37$           (101,065.79)$        
0.07 (3,979,908.63)$       (3,331,873.44)$      640,091.37$           (182,430.22)$       
0.08 (3,979,908.63)$       (3,253,371.41)$       640,091.37$           (255,006.42)$        
0.09 (3,979,908.63)$       (3,177,894.72)$       640,091.37$           (319,714.69)$        
0.1 (3,979,908.63)$       (3,105,298.66)$       640,091.37$           (377,373.04)$        
Discount Rate High Surcharge TMV of Savings Low Surcharge TMV of Savings
0.04 (16,069,681.07)$     (12,734,444.13)$    (11,449,681.07)$    (9,055,043.91)$    
0.05 (16,069,681.07)$     (12,059,906.85)$    (11,449,681.07)$    (8,571,212.88)$    
0.06 (16,069,681.07)$     (11,437,251.58)$    (11,449,681.07)$    (8,124,764.26)$    
0.07 (16,069,681.07)$    (10,861,659.34)$    (11,449,681.07)$    (7,712,216.12)$    
0.08 (16,069,681.07)$     (10,328,819.59)$    (11,449,681.07)$    (7,330,454.60)$    
0.09 (16,069,681.07)$     (9,834,871.07)$       (11,449,681.07)$    (6,976,691.04)$    
0.1 (16,069,681.07)$     (9,376,350.07)$       (11,449,681.07)$    (6,648,424.44)$    
Table 5 - Total Savings Taking Into Account the Time Value of Money
EIA Estimates
High Price of Diesel
Low Price of Diesel
 
Source: LFUCG, Smithtown, NY, EIA, OMB, Author’s Projections 
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Discount Rate Total Savings TMV of Savings
0.04 6,126,771.24$                       $998,949.07
0.05 6,126,771.24$                       $295,037.95
0.06 6,126,771.24$                       ($265,948.35)
0.07 6,126,771.24$                       ($712,505.93)
0.08 6,126,771.24$                       ($1,067,238.76)
0.09 6,126,771.24$                       ($1,348,128.11)
0.1 6,126,771.24$                       ($1,569,517.55)
Table 6 - Extention of High Surcharge/High Price Scenario 
Taking Into Account The Time Value of Money
  
Discount Rate Total Savings TMV of Savings
0.04 16,626,771.24$             $7,560,222.65
0.05 16,626,771.24$             $6,214,494.67
0.06 16,626,771.24$             $5,103,061.23
0.07 16,626,771.24$             $4,181,999.01
0.08 16,626,771.24$             $3,416,167.23
0.09 16,626,771.24$             $2,777,355.32
0.1 16,626,771.24$             $2,242,839.25
Table 7 - Extention of Low Surcharge/High Price Scenario Taking 
Into Account The Time Value Of Money
 
There exists one other hypothetical which deserves exploration.  While LFUCG replaces 21 diesel 
waste removal trucks annually—meaning that the entire fleet is replaced every 6 years.  It may be 
possible to assume a longer lifecycle with CNG trucks.  This may make the program more financially 
viable—although we cannot take depreciation of these trucks into account in terms of emissions or 
increased repairs.  If we extend the lifespan of CNG trucks to 10 years, that would reflect lifecycles used 
by San Antonio (Lopez, 2011). 
Discount Rate High Surcharge TMV of Savings Low Surcharge TMV of Savings
0.04 (7,529,374.38)$             ($6,508,405.23) (5,249,374.38)$    ($4,496,383.24)
0.05 (7,529,374.38)$             ($6,288,680.42) (5,249,374.38)$    ($4,335,981.44)
0.06 (7,529,374.38)$             ($6,081,048.41) (5,249,374.38)$    ($4,184,962.72)
0.07 (7,529,374.38)$            ($5,884,621.09) (5,249,374.38)$    ($4,042,596.56)
0.08 (7,529,374.38)$             ($5,698,590.43) (5,249,374.38)$    ($3,908,221.68)
0.09 (7,529,374.38)$             ($5,522,220.10) (5,249,374.38)$    ($3,781,238.45)
0.1 (7,529,374.38)$             ($5,354,838.00) (5,249,374.38)$    ($3,661,102.25)
Discount Rate High Surcharge TMV of Savings Low Surcharge TMV of Savings
0.04 3,040,091.37$              1,415,040.38$     5,320,091.37$     3,427,062.37$     
0.05 3,040,091.37$              1,109,414.36$     5,320,091.37$     3,062,113.33$     
0.06 3,040,091.37$              835,651.79$         5,320,091.37$     2,731,737.48$     
0.07 3,040,091.37$              590,382.66$        5,320,091.37$     2,432,407.18$     
0.08 3,040,091.37$              370,617.31$         5,320,091.37$     2,160,986.06$     
0.09 3,040,091.37$              173,700.43$         5,320,091.37$     1,914,682.08$     
0.1 3,040,091.37$              (2,729.05)$            5,320,091.37$     1,691,006.70$     
Discount Rate High Surcharge TMV of Savings Low Surcharge TMV of Savings
0.04 (9,049,681.07)$             (7,732,309.46)$    (6,769,681.07)$    (5,720,287.46)$    
0.05 (9,049,681.07)$             (7,451,921.86)$    (6,769,681.07)$    (5,499,222.88)$    
0.06 (9,049,681.07)$             (7,188,046.68)$    (6,769,681.07)$    (5,291,960.99)$    
0.07 (9,049,681.07)$            (6,939,403.25)$    (6,769,681.07)$    (5,097,378.72)$    
0.08 (9,049,681.07)$             (6,704,830.87)$    (6,769,681.07)$    (4,914,462.12)$    
0.09 (9,049,681.07)$             (6,483,275.92)$    (6,769,681.07)$    (4,742,294.27)$    
0.1 (9,049,681.07)$             (6,273,780.45)$    (6,769,681.07)$    (4,580,044.70)$    
Table 8 - Total Savings Taking Into Account the Time Value of Money & 10 Year Life Cycle
EIA Estimates
High Price of Diesel
Low Price of Diesel
 
 
Source: LFUCG, Smithtown, NY, EIA, OMB, Author’s Projections 
Source: LFUCG, Smithtown, NY, EIA, OMB, Author’s Projections 
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Table 8 takes into account a situation in which 21 waste removal trucks are replaced annually 
until LFUCG operates a full fleet of CNG trucks—which is a hypothetical 2017.  From 2018 until 2021, no 
extra costs due to purchasing CNG trucks rather than diesel trucks are subtracted from the fuel cost 
savings produced by the program.  Utilizing a 7% discount rate, this program could show savings if the 
high price of diesel were to exist within 10 years.  However, if the Low or EIA Estimates for diesel were 
to occur, this plan would not show financial savings within 10 years. 
Conclusions 
 Compressed natural gas use expanded across the country because it was touted as a cleaner 
and cheaper fuel.  However, doubts remain about both of those claims.  While CNG is considerably 
cleaner than using diesel alone, improvements can be made to trucks which would make them run as 
clean as if they utilized CNG.  Also, switching to CNG would at best represent a .08% reduction for 
Lexington in terms of greenhouse gas emissions.  However, moving into the future, if LFUCG would 
eventually like to use biomethane as a renewable fuel in its trucks, a switch to CNG would represent a 
“bridge fuel” to that technology.  Biomethane is a gas-based fuel, and therefore CNG trucks could utilize 
it, while diesel trucks, which are equipped for liquid fuels, could not.  While there remain environmental 
concerns about both compressed natural gas and diesel, these amounts are hard to quantify. 
 For financials, whether or not a switch to CNG would pay for itself depends on what assumption 
one makes about future diesel prices.  If a high price of diesel exists in the future, using compressed 
natural gas could eventually pay for itself.  If the government can purchase CNG trucks for not more 
than $40,000 above the cost of diesel trucks, the change would pay for itself late in the first contract 
period.  However, taking into account the time value of money, the payback would not occur until later 
unless the LFUCG were to extend the life of its trucks to ten years.  If the government fails to finance a 
low surcharge, the program would still pay back in the second period.  Again, once the time value of 
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money is taken into account, the project would not pay back before 2035 unless the LFUCG extends the 
life of its trucks to 10 years.   In order to make a decision about the financial viability of compressed 
natural gas in Lexington, decisions makers must decide which diesel price is most likely to exist in the 
future and which discount rate to believe.  Table 5 lists the prices of diesel used to do this analysis.  This 
table is of utmost importance.  If decision makers believe the high price is the most likely to occur, then 
compressed natural gas represents significant cost savings.  If not, a switch to CNG would CNG will lose 
the city money.  The amounts listed by the EIA are in 2009 dollars. 
EIA Price High Price Low Price
2011  $    3.028 4.723$    1.484$    
2012  $    2.917 4.550$    1.429$    
2013  $    2.977 4.645$    1.459$    
2014  $    3.033 4.732$    1.486$    
2015  $    3.091 4.822$    1.515$    
2016  $    3.206 5.002$    1.571$    
2017  $    3.289 5.131$    1.612$    
2018  $    3.379 5.271$    1.656$    
2019  $    3.461 5.400$    1.696$    
2020  $    3.526 5.500$    1.728$    
2021  $    3.532 5.509$    1.730$    
2022  $    3.586 5.594$    1.757$    
2023  $    3.639 5.677$    1.783$    
2024  $    3.690 5.756$    1.808$    
2025  $    3.736 5.829$    1.831$    
2026  $    3.763 5.871$    1.844$    
2027  $    3.808 5.941$    1.866$    
2028  $    3.809 5.941$    1.866$    
2029  $    3.865 6.030$    1.894$    
2030  $    3.834 5.981$    1.879$    
2031  $    3.851 6.007$    1.887$    
Table 5 - Price of Diesel, 2011-2031
 
 
 It therefore bears reexamining the rationales on which the EIA bases its estimates.  If one 
believes OPEC countries will allow private oil exploration and that regulations will be relaxed to allow 
Source: EIA, Author’s 
Projections 
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further drilling in the Gulf of Mexico and Canada’s oil sands, the low estimate makes sense.  However, if 
one believes that world economic growth will continue to increase, resulting in greater demand for oil; 
and environmental regulations will increase or stay the same, the high estimate becomes more likely.  
The author believes the actual estimate to be between the high estimate and the EIA point estimate to 
be the most likely outcome, but the author doubts the price of diesel will be high enough for a switch to 
CNG to pay for itself in ten years. 
 Even if switching to CNG does not represent a financial positive, there are also social benefits 
that could result from the change.  Like fireworks displays, parks, and public safety measures, a CNG 
waste removal fleet may not pay back financially, but might accrue non-market benefits which the city 
residents may value.  A switch to CNG would reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at most 0.08%..  
However, there would also be decreases in carcinogenic, but non-greenhouse emissions.  In some 
studies, CNG has been shown to emit 50 times fewer cancer-causing emissions than diesel (Turrio-
Baldassarri, 2006).  Furthermore, CNG burns odorless, invisible, and tastelessly.  This would have non-
market benefits towards visibility and general utility. 
 While these benefits can be quantified, the methods by which this end would be accomplished 
goes beyond the scope of this project.  If the city does determine that these non-market benefits would 
be worth the estimated costs of this project, it would be a good idea for the city to conduct a more 
complete benefit-cost analysis of these non-market goods. 
 In the opinion of the analyst, due to the long payback period required to justify a compressed 
natural gas program, and the small benefits which would be accrued by the switch, a CNG program does 
not represent the most efficient expenditure which the city could make in order to reduce its 
greenhouse gas emissions.  However, if high prices for diesel are seen in the future, the subject could be 
revisited.  
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Caveats 
 There exist several caveats for this analysis.  For this analysis, a 5% growth rate is assumed 
throughout.  While this estimation is based on the professional recommendation of a LFUCG statistician, 
moving twenty years into the future using it may present a problem.  Secondly, building the high and 
low estimates from the price of diesel based on EIA estimates solely on the basis of the price of oil may 
not be a perfect assumption.  However, the price of oil dominates the cost of diesel, and it is likely that 
the price of oil also enters into the equation of the cost of the other factors in the price of diesel.  
Furthermore, as discussed earlier, basing the price which Clean Energy charges for a diesel gallon 
equivalent of CNG based on the EIA estimate of the price of diesel seems odd—but it appears that there 
exists a relationship between these variables. 
 The final item to be discussed is the issue of comparativeness.  This analysis compares scenarios 
of compressed natural gas usages to scenarios of status quo, or diesel usage.  Research indicates that 
the utilization of clean diesel may include emission benefits similar to those of switching to compressed 
natural gas.  Further research ought to be completed about this alternative before completely changing 
the capital structure of the waste removal fleet of the city of Lexington, which compares the cost of 
switching to clean diesel instead of using compressed natural gas.  
Bibliography 
Ahouissoussi, Nicholas B.C., and Michael E. Wetzstein.  A Comparative Analysis of Biodiesel, Compressed 
Natural Gas, Methanol, and Diesel for Transit Bus System.  World Bank/United State Department 
of Agriculture Office of Energy. 
Annual Energy Outlook 2010 With Projections to 2035.  Energy Information Administration.  May 11, 
2010.  http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/archive/aeo10/index.html.  
ARB’s Study of Emissions from “Late-Model” Diesel and CNG Heavy-Duty Transit Buses.  California Air 
Resources Board.  April, 2002. 
Ayala, Alberto.  Personal Interview.  19 March, 2011. 
Barnett, Russell.  Personal Interview.  15 February, 2011. 
Bryson, Antonia, Joanna D. Underwood, Juliet Burdelski.  New York City’s Commerical Waste Hauling 
Fleets: An Opportunity for New York City to Ensure Cleaner Quieter Waste Collection Operations.  
Energy Visions/INFORM.  February, 2006. 
Clean Alternative Fuels: Compressed Natural Gas.  United State Environmental Protection Agency 
Transportation and Air Quality Programs Division.  March, 2002. 
Cannon, James S.  Greening Garbage Trucks: Trends in Alternative Fuel Use. 2002-2005. New York: 
INFORM, 2006. 
Chandler, Kevin, Kevin Walkowicz, Nigel Clark.  United Parcel Service CNG Truck Fleet: Final Results.  
United States Department of Energy and National Renewable Energy Laboratory Truck 
Evaluation Project.  August, 2002. 
Compressed Natural Gas Versus Diesel, Results of Vehicle Testing at Misr Lab.  Cairo Air Improvement 
Project Compressed Natural Gas Component, Chemonics International, USAID/Egypt.  March, 
2004. 
Das, L.M, Rohit Gulati.  A Comparative Evaluation of the Performance Characteristics of a Spark Ignition 
Engine Using Hydrogen and Compressed Natural Gas as Alternative Fuel.  “International Journal 
of Hydrogren Energy.”  25: 783-793.  2000. 
DiBritta, Michelle.  Personal Interview.  February 22, 2011. 
Evaluation of Impacts to Underground Sources of Drinking Water by Hydraulic Fracturing of Coalbed 
Methane Reservoirs Study.  United States Environmental Protection Agency, 2004. 
ENGINE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION et al. v. SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT et 
al.  2004.  No. 02-1343. 
Every Alternative: Clean Heavy Duty Vehicles User Experience With Natural Gas.  Air and Waste 
Management Association: Cummins Westport.  April 24, 2008. 
Gasland.  Dir. Josh Fox.  2011.  Film. 
 Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs. United States Office of 
Management and Buget.  Circular publication A-094. 
Hill, David.  Natural Gas Vehicles: Solutions from the Factory.  Encana Natural Gas.  April 9, 2010. 
Is Natural Gas a Viable Alternative to Diesel for the Trucking Industry?  American Trucking Institute.  
Kado, Norman Y., Alberto Ayala, Robert A. Okamoto, et al.  Emissions of Toxic Pollutants from 
Compressed Natural Gas and Low Sulfur Diesel-Fueled Heavy-Duty Transit Buses Tested over 
Multiple Driving Cycles.  “Environmental Science Technology.”  39, 7638-7649.  2005. 
Krupnick, Alan.  Energy, Greenhouse Gas, and Economic Implications of Natural Gas Trucks.  Wasington 
DC: Resources For The Future/National Energy Policy Institute.  June, 2010.  
Lowell, Dana M., William Parsley,  Christopher Bush, Douglas Zupo.  Comparison of Clean Diesel buses to 
CNG Busses.  Metro Transit Authority New York City Department of Buses.  2004. 
Lopez, David.  Personal Interview.  1 March, 2011. 
Melendez, M., J, Taylor, et al.  Emission Testing of Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority 
Natural Gas and Diesel Transit Buses.  National Renewable Energy Future.  December, 2005. 
Ravindra, Khaiwal, Eric Wauters, et al.  Assessment of Air Quality After The Implementation of 
Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) as a Fuel in Public Transport in Delhi, India.  “Environmental 
Monitoring and Assessment.”  115: 405-417.  2006. 
Riley, Mark.  Personal Interview.  22 February, 2011. 
Schubert, Raymond K, Scott Fable, et al.  Comparative Costs of 2010 Heavy-Duty Diesel and Natural Gas 
Technologies: Final Report.  TIAX LLC Report to the California Natural Gas Vehicle Partnership 
and South Coast Air Quality Management District.  July 15, 2005. 
Schwartz, Ariel.  Fracking,  Natural Gas’s Dirty Secret.  Fast Company.  April 11, 2011.  
http://www.fastcompany.com/1746489/when-natural-gas-is-dirtier-than-burning-coal 
Smith, Dennis A.  Renewable Natural Gas: The Role of RNG in the Clean Cities Portfolio.  U.S. Department 
of Energy Clean Cities Program.  December 1, 2010. 
Stoner, Sherry, Tim Olson, et al.  Full Fuel Cycle Assessment Well To Tank Energy Inputs, Emissions, and 
Water Impacts.  TIAX LLC Report to California Energy Commission.  February, 2007. 
Study of CNG and Diesel Transit Bus Emissions.  Air Resources Board of California Environmental 
Protection Agency.  April 22, 2004. 
Turrio-Baldassarri, Luigi, et al.  Evaluation of Emission Toxicity of Urban Bus Engines: Compressed Natural 
Gas and Comparison with Liquid Fuels.  “Science of the Total Environment.”  355: 64-77.  2006. 
Underwood, Joanna D., Antonia Bryson.  Fueling a Greener Future: NYC Metropolitan Area Garbage 
Fleets Commit to Alternative Fuels.  New York: Energy Vision, 2008. 
Underwood, Joanna D., Gail Richardson.  The US Can Act Now To Substantially Cut Oil Consumption By 
Putting Trucks And Buses On The Path To Sustainable Fuel.  Washington, DC: Energy Vision. 
Underwood, Joanna.  Personal Interview.  22 February, 2011. 
Webb, Thomas.  Lexington’s Climate Protection Efforts.  Presentation as part of University of Kentucky’s 
Earthdays in the Bluegrass Earth Hour discussion.  March 24, 2011. 
 
Appendix A – Notes from Interviews 
Interview with Alberto Ayala, Chief of Monitoring and Laboratory Division of California EPA Air 
Resources Board 
Occurred on March 18, 2011 
• Burning CNG increases the formaldehyde released, while curbing other emissions.  This is not 
unexpected, as CNG is basically methane.   The issue at hand is that CNG is a fossil fuel, and all 
fossil fuels are going to have emissions. 
• It is good I am doing this study rooted in policy because although Science drives policy, lots of 
other factors drive it too. 
• As far as politics go, there are multiple different camps in regards to CNG and its alternatives. 
• Technology is never static.  People push to make these fuels better and cleaner. 
• 10 years ago at the onset of regulatory steps, big push to clean up conventional diesel. 
• Industry wanted to retain the benefits of diesel while reducing emissions. 
• CA and Sweden “When you compare CNG to Clean Diesel, which is better?” 
o Tailpipe is one factor, but there are others. 
o With CNG not as much traditional emissions, but other problems.  Newer CNG engines 
better on emissions. 
• The scientists have a good problem on their hand the emissions are so low, it is hard to 
measure them. 
• New engines are clean, but will they remain clean after 100K miles?  200K miles?  1 million 
miles? 
• From an emissions standpoint, current technology ultra low sulfur diesel and CNG are about the 
same. 
o Issue of energy security ought to be taken into account.  Natural gas is domestic, 
petroleum is not. 
• The “Fracking” issue represents a shift.  It has nothing to do with the tailpipe.  People are 
beginning to holistically examine fuels—what it emits, whether up or downstream. 
• Politics: A few years ago, Pickens plan.  His ideas made sense (electricwind, 
transportationNG), but they have not really caught on because diesel has become so much 
cleaner.  This is an example of an efficient market.  
Notes from conversation with Russell Barnet of Smithtown, NY 
February 15, 2011 
• Smithtown was the first community outside of California with CNG refuse collection fleet.  It 
came in January 2006 and opened in January 2007. 
• Started with one fueling station, which was the largest on the east coast.  The second station 
opened April 2010. 
• The Smithtown model is to contract fleet of refuse trucks, but to mandate in contracts with 
carters than only CNG trucks can be used. 
• The Smithtown fueling station has been designed with redundancy to allow for fueling to occur 
even if part of the station is shut down. 
• On Long Island, there are 4 million people in 14 different towns.  Mr. Barnett is working to use 
CNG in all towns. 
• The 2nd station is 6 miles from the first station. 
• Smithtown financial model is conservative.  The government sticks to its core competencies.  
CNG is used because it is cleaner.  They issued an RFP, and Clean Energy won the bid to provide 
CNG. 
• The town to the east (Brookhaven) services 450,000 people, with 67 trucks from 3 
manufacturers.  They use the new station as well. 
• Municipality has the ability to create demand, and can use this as a bargaining chip.  Smithtown 
used this to create a fixed price/gallon.   The price has been fixed for a seven year period. 
• Contractors love the fixed price per gallon, as it reduces uncertainty in forecasting fuel prices.  It 
led to good contracts for refuse collection.  The savings were passed to the government.  Risks 
eliminated for everyone. 
• The trucks used straight diesel before switching to CNG. 
• The primary reason Smithtown switched to CNG was for cost-savings.  The benefits include 
predictability in fuel costs, domestic supply v. imported supply, cleaner burning fuels and trucks 
start and stop at every house (quieter). 
• Smithtown saves about $3/home.  Although there is significant fuel savings, the CNG trucks 
costs more than diesel trucks. 
• Smithtown has a population of about 118,000.  It has 22 refuse trucks, operated by 4 carters.  
The carters use 2 different manufacturers.  They use 250,000 diesel gallon equivalents per year 
in fuel.  
• The program is very popular and has won awards.  At first there was resistance from operators, 
but that went away after operators saw how cleanly the fuel burned. 
• Lots of different trucks now building in a CNG option. 
Notes from conversation with Michelle DiBrita of Brookhaven, NY 
Occurred on February 22, 2011 
• Brookhaven contracts with outside carters and has 35 different contracts. 
• Like Smithtown, all contracts are required to use CNG trucks. 
• Clean Energy built a fill station at the landfill, but it is open to the public for use. 
• Brookhaven opted for CNG after the success of Smithtown. 
• The Town Board decided to opt for CNG.  A resolution was passed, and the community received 
the program well. 
• There is an emissions statement, I have it. 
• There are some cost savings.  They aren’t always good, but they often are. 
• Ms. DiBrita would not speculate as to why the town board wanted to switch to CNG. 
• Service provision has not changed due to the switch in fuel sources, but there are a significantly 
smaller number of complaint calls.  The CNG trucks are quite a bit quieter and cleaner than 
diesel trucks. 
• Clean Energy contracts directly with Smithtown, and then Clean Energy contracts directly with 
the carters. 
Notes from Conversation with David Lopez of San Antonio, TX 
Occurred on March 1, 2011 
• CNG was used in CA for quite some time before coming to Texas. 
• San Antonio owns the local gas utility, and therefore provides fuel to Energy Vision to compress. 
• Went for RFP for filling utility and purchased 30 site-load refuse trucks, uses cart collection. 
• Clean Energy built facility 
• Have been using for about 2 years, it has been an interesting deal.  Fuel Costs were original 
attraction. 
• After government grants and rebates, the price was around $1m. 
• As it has gone along, trucks have not been quite as powerful and provide less torque.  New 
diesel trucks are just as good on emissions, and San Antonio is on the fence about expanding the 
use of CNG. 
• They provide the market price for CNG. 
• Usually replaced 15-16 trucks annually, but replaced 30 trucks at once to start this project. 
• Savings on fuel cost are about $1/dge.  But savings against amortization are less.  Trucks have 
about $30-$40K bump in cost. 
Notes from conversation with Mark Riley, General Manager of Eastern US for Clean Energy Corp 
Occurred on February 23, 2011 
• Although a flat fuel fee is in place on Long Island, not all municipalities use it. 
o Flat fee as a predetermined number hedges contracts.  There is an extended annual cost 
of fuel which is accounted for in other fees. 
o Long Island compressor built in 2006. 
• There are two stations—one in Brookhaven and the other in Smithtown. 
• Typically, a station takes 6-8 months to build.  The contract with Smithtown is for 20 years, and 
fixed prices are in place for 7 years. 
• Typical base term is 10 years, but it is moving towards 15 years. 
o Contracts require a recovery term 
o Station life is typically 15-20 years 
• Typical modelCE invest in the capital for long term fuel contracts and the rights to sell to 3rd 
parties. 
o San Antonio is a little different. 
• Lots of municipalities are privatizing their carting. 
o This issue is regionalized, however. 
o Smithtown model is very good.  The city controlled the way refuse was pick up. 
• Fleets buy CNG trucks because life cycle costs are cheaper. 
• Towns using CNG: Huntington, Montgomery Co, MD.  FL: Ft Myers, Polk Co, Ft. Lauderdale.  
Philadelphia, PA. 
• Biodiesel: high cost, less benefit than CNG. 
o CNG: $1 savings/gallon 
• Motivations for CNG: Environmental benefits and cost savings. 
o Half as pollutant as diesel trucks.  GHG benefits. 
o Many municipalities signed on to Kyoto Protocol. 
Notes from Conversation with Joanna Underwood, President of Energy Vision 
Occurred on March 6, 2011 
• CNG as a fuel was launched in CA, enthusiasm by Boone Pickens. 
• Underwood had breakfast with him 12 years ago to speak about a Path to Hydrogen. 
• A real addition to the momentum was the South Coast Air Quality District ruling in California 
that heavy duty fleets in CA with greater than 15 vehicles could not use petroleum based fuels.  
CNG then became the best option. 
• This created a market for CNG in heavy fleets.  Systems were introduced in late 80s, cleaner fuel, 
but issues associated with the fleets and fuels. 
• A ruling by the Bush administration stated that only a full, state wide rule could go into an 
effect, and that the regional rule was out of bounds.  This ruling mean that only government 
fleets were required to use CNG. 
• However, the rule was changed again and stated that fleets with contracts with the government 
can be subject to a “no petro” rule. 
• The next place CNG went was San Antonio. 
• In 1989, the New York Department of Sanitation utilized CNG, but it was in a different era of the 
fuel.  Although they implemented CNG in parts of the largest fleet in the United States, they 
gave it up. 
• In 2006, Russell Barnett met Ms. Underwood at a conference, where she presented on alternate 
fuels.  He brought CNG to the east coast.  Mr. Barnett did a lot of research on CNG, and realized 
there could be significant economic gains from utilizing CNG.  Barnett drew up contracts which 
mandated private haulers utilize CNG, which was an extraordinary move.  Bids had to work for 
the haulers—which meant they had to pay a premium of $50-$60 K more than diesel trucks.  
The experience in Smithtown was catalytic.  Other folks from other municipalities came to 
Smithtown to see the project.  The program worked well, and Russell Barnett was an effective 
spokesperson for CNG. 
• There was a ripple effect from Smithtown—people with existing fleets saw Smithtown and 
contacted Clean Energy about the program.  Also, the BP oil spill pushed concern about petro-
based fuels. 
• Energy Vision/Inform’s purpose was to inform public about fuel.  They studied lots of different 
fuels, and CNG works.  Two levels of importance—it is much cleaner for air pollution and cuts 
GHGs by 20%, is secure domestic fuel and has greater economic security and less noise. 
• However, it also has significant long term benefits.  With the adoption of CNG, there will be a 
refueling system and trucks which accept gas-based fuel, rather than liquid based fuels.  
Biomethane is the fuel of the future, rather than hydrogen.  Biomethane is carbon neutral or 
carbon negative.  Biomethand and CNG are essentially the same fuel from different sources 
(CH4). 
• Energy Vision helps the DoE with workshops of biomethane and other renewable natural gasses. 
• New Jersey is looking into RNGs heavily. 
• Biomethane and CNG represent the only choices for heavy duty vehicles to move to a 
sustainable fuel.  Electric and hybrid are not viable options for heavy duty trucks because they 
require too much power.  Don’t bet on risky stuff. 
• Honda Civic GX is a natural gas vehicle.  Bigger in Europe.  People buying CNG vehicles typically 
do it as a second vehicle because of refueling concerns.  There is a “home refueling” kit in place 
for houses that use natural gas for heat.  The issue with electric vehicles come from batteries—
can they be recycled and can we get a “smart grid” in place?  This is a big, long term 
infrastructure question.  Don’t count anything out.  Heavy Duty vehicles account for 4% of 
infrastructure and 25% of fuel demand.  It’s the best place to start. 
• Municipalities are the biggest driver by mandating contractors to use CNG.  NYC owns its own 
haulers.   Newark, NJ used to but have now privatized.   
• If the municipality owns the fleet, it is more challenging.  But it can be done—as has been seen 
in NYC. 
• Is CNG just another “fossil fuel.”—not in her opinion. 
• Put Tracey in touch with Joanna. 
 
 
